

Regulating the Social and Environmental Performance of the Australian Minerals Industry: A Sociological Analysis of Emerging Forms of Governance¹

Petrina Schiavi

Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining (CSRSM) and School of Social Science
The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia

Paper presented at the Regulatory Institutions Network Conference, 7-8 December 2005,
ANU, Canberra.

¹ This paper presents some of the preliminary findings of my fieldwork undertaken as part of my PhD commenced in 2003. My PhD research is made possible by a scholarship jointly funded by the Centre for Social Responsibility for Mining, the Sustainable Mining Institute and the UQ Graduate School. The scholarship is supplemented by a Studentship from CSIRO (Minerals) and CSIRO (Mining and Exploration).

Introduction

A growing number of voluntary regulatory initiatives relevant to the social and environment impact of the mining industry have emerged since the mid-1990s. These have taken a range of forms, including reporting mechanisms, guidance documents, management systems, industry codes of conduct and third party certification schemes. Some of the initiatives are Australian-led (such as the Minerals Council of Australia Codes and Frameworks), while others have emerged as a result of international consultations and activities (such as the International Council of Metals and Mining Sustainable Development Framework). Despite their national or international affiliation, all of the initiatives included in my research have application to mining activities in Australia, or the international activities of Australian minerals companies such as the running of mining operations in other countries, or export-related activities.

One of the trends that can be observed in the evolution of voluntary initiatives applicable to the mining industry is a movement towards the development and implementation of systems for verification and certification. For example, four specific projects involving a range of participants have commenced since 2000 that apply third party certification as their preferred framework. Out of these four projects, two have concluded with the launch of certification schemes while the other two are reaching the concluding stages of their research and development phase. In addition, many established private initiatives are working towards processes for independent verification, including a consideration of third party certification processes.

This paper seeks to answer the following research questions: what factors are contributing to the movement towards certification, and what are the regulatory implications of this?

The emergence of industry-specific certification schemes was examined by Tim Bartley (2003) in his case study of the forestry and apparel industries. Bartley's comparative analysis found that there were two sets of dynamics that contributed to the evolution of certification systems in these two otherwise apparently disparate industries during the 1990s. These were: firstly, the impact of social movement campaigns that targeted companies, and, secondly, the institutional context of neo-liberalism and free trade. Bartley suggested that his findings would apply to other settings given two conditions: the industry must be one in which there is social movement pressure directed at companies that value their brand reputations, and the commodity chains in the industry must be heavily international in scope. I argue that these two conditions are met in relation to the mining industry, and it therefore offers a context in which to test Bartley's conclusions.

In this paper, I discuss the development of voluntary initiatives in the mining industry, and explore the factors contributing to the emergence of certification schemes. Transnational mining corporations dominate the development and adoption of voluntary initiatives in the mining industry, and these companies form the focus of my research. Following on from Gunningham and Sinclair's (2001, 2002) research on the mining

industry, I expect that issues of credibility, reputation and a desire to protect a ‘social license to operate’ will play a critical role. I also test my findings against Bartley’s conclusions regarding the key dynamics that contribute to the emergence of certification systems. Finally, I consider some of the broader implications of certification for the regulation of the mining industry.

This paper is based on research conducted during the course of my PhD that I commenced in 2003. Data collection methods included: in-depth, qualitative interviews with representatives of industry, NGOs and government regulators; document analysis; and review of secondary data sources such as published and unpublished papers. This paper presents some of findings from interviews conducted in Australia and the USA in 2003 and 2004 with high level executives of some of the world’s largest minerals corporations with operations in Australia. These executives held roles of responsibility with regard to the environmental and/or social performance of the company for which they worked. Other key informants include NGO project staff involved in the development of voluntary initiatives for the mining industry, and government officials with responsibility for regulating mining-related issues.

Voluntary initiatives in minerals industry


In using the term ‘voluntary initiatives’ in this paper, I acknowledge that the adoption of the schemes may not necessarily be purely voluntary – there are often a number of forces at play that leave a company with no choice but to adopt the initiative (Gunningham and Sinclair 2001:3). For example, pressures to adopt a voluntary initiative may come from suppliers, employees, a need to protect reputation or brand, commercial forces, and even legal or regulatory requirements (OECD 2001). It would, in fact, be a mark of a scheme’s success if it reached a critical mass and so successfully captured market forces that a business could not ‘opt out’ of it (Leipziger 2003).

The marked increase in the number of voluntary initiatives relevant to the minerals industry in recent years is demonstrated in Table 1 which displays the total numbers of voluntary initiatives launched by year. This table also indicates the numbers of initiatives in which representatives of the minerals industry (personnel from mining corporations or minerals industry associations) have played a key role, either as the primary driver of the initiative, or as a significant contributor through participation in working groups and/or funding.

Over this period there have been large multi-stakeholder initiatives seeking to address broad issues relating to social and environmental performance, and a number of smaller projects dealing with specific issues initiated by single groups such as NGOs and companies. The initiatives are at various stages of evolution: some are still at their infancy, others are converging or co-operating on various issues, and most are subject to regular mechanisms for review. There are also a handful of initiatives that are still at ‘research and development stage’.

Table 1: Number of voluntary initiatives by year launched, and number of initiatives in which minerals industry played a key role.

Voluntary initiatives relevant to minerals industry



The table demonstrates that minerals companies and their representatives have played a key role in the development of many of the initiatives that address the social and environmental performance of the minerals industry. Of the 48 initiatives launched since 1991, minerals companies were the key driver of 23 and were significantly involved in 6 through involvement in working groups or by way of major funding. Some of the reasons for these high levels of involvement are explored in this paper with reference to empirical evidence. It is also significant to note that it is the large minerals companies that are developing and adopting these initiatives, not the small or medium enterprises, and this has a number of implications that are considered in later stages of this paper.

A chronology demonstrating the emergence of voluntary initiatives relevant to the Australian minerals industry is presented in Appendix 1 (adapted from Solomon et al. 2006, forthcoming). The types of initiatives detailed in the chronology include research and development exercises, reporting mechanisms, industry codes of conduct and certification schemes. Some of the initiatives are Australian-led (such as the Minerals Council of Australia Codes and Frameworks), while others have emerged as a result of international consultations and activities (such as the International Council of Metals and Mining Sustainable Development Framework). Despite their national or international affiliation, all of the initiatives listed have application to mining activities in Australia, or the international activities of Australian minerals companies such as the running of mining operations in other countries, or export-related activities.

Over this period, four third-party certification projects have commenced that seek to address particular issues in the mining industry. Of these, two certification schemes have

been launched, one that deals with cyanide use in gold mining, and the other designed to prevent trade in conflict diamonds. The other two certification projects are reaching the concluding stages of their research and development activities - one is considering the feasibility of mine site certification, while the other is seeking to develop a third party certification scheme for 'green lead'. In addition, two existing schemes – the Global Reporting Initiative and the ICMM Sustainable Development Framework - have commenced projects to investigate approaches to allow for verification of reports produced pursuant to their frameworks.

The evolution of voluntary initiatives

All of my informants observed that there had been significant changes within the minerals industry since the mid-1990s with regard to social and environmental issues. Reputation and credibility issues were the most commonly cited as being significant drivers of this change. If companies were not already suffering negative consequences as a result of action against them for own poor social and environmental performance, either by way of court cases or NGO campaigns, they perceived themselves as being 'tarded by the same brush' as poorly performing companies. Therefore, not only was it important to individual companies to improve the reputation of the minerals industry as a whole, but companies also sought to develop a means to differentiate themselves from poorly-performing companies. Voluntary initiatives offered the potential to achieve these goals.

A range of dynamics emerged during the 1990s that contributed to an environment conducive to the development of voluntary initiatives. These included: a rise in momentum within and power of non-governmental organisations supporting environmental and social issues; the unprecedented ability to rapidly spread information through electronic communications; a number of high profile mining disasters (eg Ok Tedi); a reduction in resources available to state institutions; increasing power and influence of multi-national corporations; a growing dialogue around risk management within industry; and the adoption of the United Nations Rio Declaration and Agenda 21. Many interviewees also noted a shift in Australian regulatory approaches away from 'command and control' to an encouragement of 'beyond compliance' during this same period.

The first voluntary initiative to address the performance of the Australian minerals industry was the Australian Minerals Industry Code for Environmental Management (MCA Code) launched by the Australian minerals industry peak representative body, the Minerals Council of Australia, in 1996 following a number of years of development. The MCA Code applied to the Australian and international operations of Australian signatories. Many of my interview respondents indicated that the main impetus for development of the MCA Code was the recognition that the minerals industry had to 'self-regulate or be regulated' following increasing pressure from NGOs and government, particularly around the social and environmental performance of Australian companies overseas.

(We established the Code (and) the initiatives that the Australian government and others were pushing, you know, sort of fell away and they got involved our process to help develop that Code. So it was very effective in terms of demonstrating, yeah, industry is prepared and capable to try and regulate itself.
Mining Executive #3, Melbourne

While the desire to avoid regulation may have driven the *development* of the MCA Code, I found that the main motivation for *adopting* the MCA Code was the opportunity it provided for companies seeking to improve their reputation. The Code not only required signatories to disclose instances of poor performance, it also offered them an opportunity to publish information about their good performance:

... we needed to find ways to tell our stakeholders that we were performing to these standards. Things like the Code (MCA Code for Environmental Management) and public reporting ... offered us an opportunity to actually move beyond where others perceived us to be for us to try and put a position that 'this is where we think we are. Mining Executive #7, Melbourne

In 1998, the first 11 industry reports against the MCA Code were published, and were met with interest by a number of groups, including other mining companies keen to measure their own performance against other companies. Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) conducted an analysis of the reports which was published in 1999 as “Ore or Overburden”. Their analysis found the industry reports wanting with regard to the nature of what was reported, particularly as they did not apply any mechanisms for independent verification. These criticisms were taken into account by the MCA in their subsequent review of the Code in 2000, and a provision was included for the independent verification of the company reports. This required a number of companies to “*reassess how they actually conform with the code*”, and many companies’ scores were down-rated by the independent assessor. As one mining corporation executive acknowledged, “*it’s just natural for people to assess themselves favourably*”.

The development of voluntary initiatives in the decade from 1996 can be characterised as a period of progression, convergence and co-operation. To demonstrate:

- As well being a major influence on the amendments to the MCA Code, the WWF report, ‘*Ore or Overburden*’, also prompted BHP (now BHP Billiton) to engage an NGO to assess its Cannington site. This triggered the development of the Green Lead principle, which is now the central objective of a global initiative for the certification of lead.
- The 1996 MCA Code had a significant influence in the development of the ICMM Sustainable Development Framework in 2003. Then in 2004, the ICMM Framework provided the structure for the MCA Enduring Value (which replaced the MCA Code), and the Mining Certification Evaluation Project (MCEP) Principles and Criteria.

- The GRI has been working with the ICMM to create a mining supplement to its sustainable development reporting that will allow mining companies to report against the ICMM Sustainable Development Framework.

A similar pattern of convergence and co-operation is recognised by Leipziger (2003:508) in her overview of codes for corporate responsibility. She also noted that a key challenge for the corporate responsibility movement is to “develop trust through verification in the face of growing cynicism from a range of stakeholders” (Leipziger 2003:508). There is a discernable trend towards developing systems for verification in new and existing initiatives in the minerals industry, and this is one reason for the high levels of activity around voluntary initiatives over the past few years.

Credibility through certification

My research strongly supports the assertions by Gunningham and Sinclair (2001:4; 2002:134) that improved credibility is the main impetus for the adoption of voluntary initiatives by large, highly visible transnational corporations in the “reputation-sensitive” minerals industry. This is especially significant when considering that these corporations are not only the most eager group within the minerals industry to adopt voluntary initiatives, they are also driving the development of the majority of initiatives through participation and/or funding.

We’ve talked about that for many, many years how the fact the value that our reputation has in our communities and with regulators and our stakeholders. And really our intent is to build that over time so we can then transfer that value to some new place, and people can go back and look and say ‘well, here’s what they did there, and this is what we can expect them to do here’ because we have that reputation capital. Mining Executive #12, USA

The following statement offers an insight into the motivations of transnational mining corporations in relation to the perceived benefit of certification schemes, such as that being considered for mine site operations:

(mine site certification is) all about reinforcing our reputation which therefore opens opportunities. If we can say, look, all of our mine sites are certified and if we come and develop a project in your country, we’ll get that certified as well. If the scheme has credibility, then people will feel more comfortable with us than they might with a competitor who doesn’t have sites certified or only has one certified or has no intention of getting certified. So it provides again another benchmark of credibility and performance I think. So it is really about reputation, I’m not sure there’s anything else. Mining Executive #3, Australia

The nature of mining activities means that a social license to operate is crucial to many minerals enterprises, especially those involved in mineral extraction. The site of most

minerals operations is dictated by the location of accessible mineral deposits, and most remaining mineral deposits are situated in remote, environmentally and socially sensitive areas.

Linked to a social license to operate is the ability for a company to differentiate itself from others in the industry, particularly if the industry as a whole has some problems with its reputation. This can be of assistance when there is competition for approvals to exploit new mineral deposits. Large minerals corporations acknowledge that they have a distinct advantage over smaller operators with regard to differentiation because it can be “*quite costly to satisfy or demonstrate that you’ve satisfied the requirements*”.

My data showed that the credibility offered by third party certification through independent auditing was the major attraction for companies to adopt such a scheme, while benefits through product differentiation of mined product were of secondary importance. The nature of most mineral product is such that tracking a chain of custody from mine site to product is very challenging. For example, minerals from a variety of sources are often processed together, and it is often not financially or practically feasible for a company to have its own separate processor for its product. Diamonds are perhaps the only mineral commodity that can be relatively easily tracked through a chain of custody, because each diamond is unique. In addition to the difficulties inherent in relation to chain of custody issues, there may be a number of challenges in raising consumer awareness to encourage a demand for eco-labelled mineral products. Minerals are used in the manufacture of a vast array of products, and the everyday consumer is rarely cognisant of the existence of minerals in the item they are looking to purchase. It is possible that the ecolabelling of minerals would have more likelihood of success if targeted at large manufacturing corporations (for example, motor vehicle or home appliance makers) government purchasing programs, or if it was driven by legislation (such as the REACH legislation - Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals - currently being finalised in the EU which requires ‘whole of life cycle responsibility’ for hazardous chemicals).

Improved performance

The stated purpose of most voluntary initiatives is to improve the social and environmental performance of the minerals industry, and this is how they are promoted to the public. But my research findings show that ‘improved performance’ is not the principle goal of these initiatives– they are about reputation, trust, credibility, relationships with stakeholders, and access to new sites.

Meeting certain levels of environmental and social performance pursuant to the requirements of voluntary initiatives is essential for engendering trust or confidence in the initiative, but the large transnational minerals corporations that develop and adopt many of these voluntary initiatives are already proactive with regard to addressing social and environmental imperatives in their operations. They report their performance in annual reports devoted to social and environmental issues, and employ personnel with responsibility for social and environmental issues.

When asked what would be the best way to deal with underperformers in the minerals industry, the answer from participants in my research was not, interestingly enough, voluntary initiatives. Instead, the answer was unequivocally:

Government regulation. It's that simple. It's that simple. If it's made legal or illegal to do something, then that will dictate behaviour, and anything else is secondary quite frankly. Mining Executive #9, Australia

Many of the interviewees perceive the typical “underperformer” in the minerals industry as a small operator, usually involved in small-scale exploration. They are seen to avoid the same kinds of stakeholder pressure as large enterprises, and so concerns about reputation does not drive their behavior. But some acknowledged that the larger enterprises do not always perform to the required standard:

I mean, accidents can happen in any industry and part of it is how well you address and how well you manage those. Mining Executive #12, USA

Large corporations have access to substantial resources and marketing personnel whose expertise can be used to help them “communicate” their way out of instances of poor performance. It would appear, therefore, that the opportunity offered by voluntary initiatives for “reputation management” is welcomed. By allowing companies to communicate positive messages about their performance to stakeholders, the reputation capital that they build up may help them gain forgiveness for ‘slip-ups’.

Large corporations have a multitude of tools at their disposal for improving their performance; what they do need are more tools for communicating their performance to stakeholders.

... many of our key stakeholders still believe that we are the dark and dirty industry that obviously 100 years ago we were. So we have a major issue in trying to, um, get across what we think is the image of the modern mining industry. Mining Executive #7, Australia

What might be the implications for governance if these large mining enterprises do achieve their goal to be trusted more? In answering this question it is necessary to consider, trusted more by whom? Which stakeholders are being targeted by mining companies keen to promote their good work, and engender greater trust?

As one NGO observes:

The thing is that very few people read the reports... So to some extent the reporting might be useful for those who confine themselves simply to looking at those sorts of documents, who want to be persuaded that all is OK. But really the vast majority of the audiences that the mining companies hope to win over aren't going to be all that moved by these glib reports coming out saying you know ‘all

is well, all is well!’ They are going to look for, well, what are the examples on the ground of happy communities or whatever. Again that hasn’t been achieved to any major satisfaction. NGO #1, Australia

Large minerals corporations invest a lot of resources in stakeholder mapping and analysis. Further research would be required to analyse who their key stakeholders are, and it would be expected that these stakeholder groups would change depending on location, time and issue.

Regulatory issues

Even though the avoidance of government regulation has been a motivation for the development of some voluntary initiatives, government regulation is also welcomed for a variety of reasons. Many companies that have gone ‘beyond compliance’ prefer higher standards of government regulation because it provides a regulatory safety net that levels the playing field for them; they are no longer competing with companies that can cut costs because their standards of performance are lower.

So we want the government, governments globally, to hold people accountable to solid regulations and that levels the playing field for us, and that’s important. Mining Executive #3, Australia

Many industry representatives also hope that demonstrating a commitment to go ‘beyond compliance’ through the adoption of credible voluntary initiatives may lead to preferential or differential treatment by government regulators. One mining company executive described the desired balance as follows:

I mean, we would like to get recognition of good performance in terms of less regulatory intervention, but we still want that baseline to address the companies that don’t have the track record, don’t have the commitments, aren’t involved the voluntary initiatives etc. So it’s really, I would argue, for recognition where you are a good operator with strong regulatory sort of safety net as I said to pick up the ones that just aren’t going to do it voluntarily. So that’s, yeah, how it should be. So we’ll see how it evolves over the next few years. Mining Executive #3, Australia

Interviews with government regulators suggest the possibility of this happening – they spend a disproportionate amount of time with small operators who require a lot more assistance with compliance issues than large corporations, and it would actually make their jobs a lot easier if there was a different strand of regulation for large and small operators. It may be then, that the adoption of voluntary initiatives by large mining corporations may result in some regulatory flexibility. At the same time, new institutions are emerging with the financial and in-kind assistance of large mining corporations, such as the governing bodies of certification schemes, which may eventually function to replace some of the current roles of government regulators.

Conclusion

I think there's a change in the discourse. I think there's a change in the language and particularly amongst the corporate end, but it remains unclear as to what differences there are on the ground. NGO #3, Melbourne

There has been a significant increase in the numbers of voluntary initiatives addressing the social and environmental performance of the minerals industry in recent years. Recent activity indicates a future trend towards the development and implementation of systems for verifying claims in relation to voluntary initiatives, especially in the form of third party certification schemes. Large transnational minerals corporations dominate the development and adoption of voluntary initiatives, and have been contributing significant financial and human resources to the development of certification schemes.

I found that the two key dynamics identified by Bartley, namely: the impact of social movement campaigns that targeted companies that value their brand reputations, and the institutional context of neo-liberalism and free trade applied to the mining industry. I argue, however, that Bartley's notion of "brand reputations" could be broadened in the context of the mining industry to a more general notion of "reputation capital". This would allow for a consideration of the influence of non-consumer market forces such as stakeholder expectations on the emergence of certification schemes in the mining industry, as well as the crucial role played by the mining industry's need to obtain and maintain a social license to operate (Gunningham and Sinclair 2001, 2002). The certification schemes examined by Bartlett relied on consumer preferences to attract companies to the scheme. The nature of mineral products is such that the tracking of mined product through a chain of custody to the final product can be a challenging task, with very few commodities (for example, diamonds) lending themselves easily to such a process.

When asked to identify the best method for dealing with underperformers in the minerals industry, the mining executives interviewed consistently answered 'government regulation'. For mining companies that already go beyond compliance with regard to social and environmental performance, increased government regulation of these issues can at times work to their advantage by creating a more level playing field and by giving them a strategic edge by being able to continue with operations while others are busy changing their practices or putting new systems into place to address the new requirements. Large minerals corporations still, however, want to be regulated less by the government. There is a possibility that one of the future outcomes of the commitment by large minerals corporations to credible voluntary initiatives such as certification schemes may be differential treatment by government regulators.

It emerged from my research that the primary driver for the involvement of the large, transnational mining corporations in the development and adoption of voluntary initiatives relating to social and environmental imperatives was reputation, and this

supports the findings of Gunningham and Sinclair (2001:4; 2002:134). Reputation is significant as it impacts upon the ability of individual minerals corporations to obtain and maintain a social license to operate and to differentiate themselves from other mining enterprises. This in turn plays a critical role in the growth of transnational mining operations, especially with regard to a corporation's ability to gain access to new sites or expand existing operations.

Improved social and environmental performance is the stated intention of many of the voluntary initiatives relevant to the mining industry, and a necessary one if the initiative is to play a role in enhancing a signatory's trustworthiness. Improved performance could be seen, however, as a secondary outcome of these initiatives because the companies that adopt them are usually high performers that already operate 'beyond compliance'. Transnational mining corporations that are proactive in relation to social and environmental issues have a number of internal mechanisms to assist their performance at their disposal – what they do lack are credible means to communicate their performance to key stakeholders. Third party certification schemes (with appropriate institutional arrangements in place) are attractive to these corporations because they have the potential to offer a credible means to verify their performance claims.

REFERENCES

- Bartley, T. (2003). Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements, and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields. *Politics & Society*, 31, 433-464.
- Beale, C. (2004). How do the Equator Principles Apply to Mining and Metals Projects? *ICMM Newsletter*, 3.
- Cooney, J. (2005). Mining in Developing Countries: New Rules for an Old Game. *Natural Resources Canada MMS Managers' Conference*. Gatineau, Quebec.
- Gunningham, N., & Sinclair, D. (2001). *Voluntary Approaches to Environmental Protection: Lessons from the Mining and Forestry Sectors* (pp. 40). Canberra: Australian Centre for Environmental Law, Australian National University.
- (2002). *Leaders and Laggards: Next-Generation Environmental Regulation*. Sheffield: Greenleaf.
- ICMM (2004). NGOs Launch Anti-Goldmining Campaign. *ICMM Newsletter*, 3.
- Leipziger, D. (2003). *The Corporate Responsibility Code Book*. Sheffield: Greenleaf.
- OECD (2001). *Private Initiatives for Corporate Responsibility: An Analysis* (pp. 30). (http://iris.sourceoecd.org/v1=14384222/cl=98/nw=1/rpsv/workingpapers/18151957/wp_5lgsjhvj8v0s_long.htm)
- Solomon, F., Schiavi, P., Horowitz, L., Rouse, A., & Rae, M. (2006). *Mining Certification Evaluation Project (MCEP) Final Report*. Melbourne: WWF forthcoming.

APPENDIX ONE: Chronology of Voluntary Initiatives for Improved Social and Environmental Performance Relevant to the Australian Minerals Industry
(Adapted from Solomon, Fiona et al, 2005, forthcoming)

YEAR	INITIATIVE
1991	World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) commenced
1992	Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development adopted
1996	ISO14001 launched Australian Mining Industry Code for Environmental Management (1996) launched First Environment Report in Mining Industry published by WMC Mining
1997	Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000) launched
1998	Normandy Mining Limited - Five Star Assessment System adopted Global Mining Initiative (GMI) commenced
1999	WWF-Australia's "Ore or Overburden" report re: Australian Mining Industry Code for Environmental Management published North Qld Conservation Council (NQCC) appraise BHP Cannington
2000	Cyanide Code conceived following Baia Mare spill MCA Code for Environmental Management (2000) reviewed to require verification of reports Global Compact launched Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights applying to extractive sector NQCC Report on BHP Cannington - "Broadening our Horizons" published Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) launched the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines The Mining Ombudsman established by Oxfam CAA (now Oxfam Australia) Kimberley Process conceived
2001	Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at a Local Level (APELL) for Mining launched International Council for Metals and Mining (ICMM) commenced The Extractive Industries Review was initiated by the World Bank Group
2002	Mining Certification Evaluation Project working group commenced Newmont Mining Company purchase Normandy and adopt 5 Star Assessment System The International Cyanide Management Code (Cyanide Code) launched. Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) launched. The Mining, Metals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) report published ICMM Sustainable Development Framework launched
2003	Equator Principles launched ICMM Sustainable Development Framework adopted by ICMM members. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Principles launched. ICMM members sign an undertaking with the World Conservation Union (IUCN) not to 'explore or mine in World Heritage Areas'. Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) implemented.
2004	"Final World Bank Group EIR Management Response" published First Green Lead Workshop held in London Tiffany & Co publish an open letter in the Washington Post re: Cabinet Mountains A coalition of NGOs respond with a letter thanking the CEO & Chairman of the Board of Tiffany's Updated version of ISO14001 launched, replacing ISO14001:1996. MCA Enduring Value launched Earthworks/Mineral Policy Center and Oxfam America - "No Dirty Gold," and "Dirty Metals" campaigns

YEAR	INITIATIVE
2005	<p>ICMM's 16 Corporate members agreed to report "in accordance with" the GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines and to work with the GRI to develop a Mining and Metals Sector Supplement</p> <p>The Council for Responsible Jewellery Practices (CRJP) founded Green Lead Pilot Programs to take place</p> <p>EITI Criteria</p> <p>Mining and Metals Sector Supplement developed</p> <p>Government of Canada introduced legislation to implement the KPCS in Canada</p> <p>International Cyanide Management Institute (ICMI) began accepting signatory applications to the Cyanide Code</p> <p>Framework for Responsible Mining published</p> <p>Performance Standards of the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank scheduled for completion</p> <p>ICMM Verification project commenced</p>
2006	<p>Final Report of MCEP to be published</p> <p>ICMM review of the Sustainable Development Framework is scheduled to commence</p> <p>The third generation of GRI Guidelines (G3) will be released.</p>